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COMMENTS 
SILENCE IS NOT ALWAYS GOLDEN: MORTGAGE 
PREPAYMENT IN THE COMMERCIAL LOAN CONTEXT 
Carl Adams owns a small hardware store in Baltimore County. 
Through much hard work, he has been able to establish a reputation 
for knowledge, service, and dependability, which has resulted in the 
steady growth of his business despite the recent slump in the con-
struction and housing industries. After renting space for several years, 
Carl now has the opportunity to purchase his store building. As his 
attorney, you are able to negotiate what you believe is an excellent 
arrangement for Carl. The owner of the building, John Walker, has 
agreed to take back a purchase money mortgage for all but a minimal 
down payment at a favorable interest rate. The twenty-year term you 
have convinced the owner to accept will keep Carl's payments rela-
tively low, which is important to Carl. Using a standard form note 
and mortgage you obtain from the library, the deal closes. Carl is 
pleased and speaks highly of your work to his friends and customers. 
You close the file on the transaction, satisfied that you have served 
Carl well. 
But have you? It is now eight years later, and Carl speaks of 
your service with a different tone. The economy is flourishing, and 
along with it, Carl's hardware store. Carl has the opportunity to 
expand his store into the adjoining building. Interest rates have 
decreased significantly, and Carl's bank is willing to lend him enough 
.to refinance the existing loan and purchase the new space. He will 
be able to save a substantial amount in monthly payments by 
structuring the financing in this manner rather than taking out a 
mortgage only on the second bUilding. Carl is shocked and angry 
when John Walker tells him that he will refuse to accept early payoff 
of his loan. Carl calls your office insisting that you immediately 
write Walker a letter informing him that he has no choice but to 
accept the payoff. You set up an appointment with Carl for the next 
day and begin to research the issue. As you review the form note 
you used, a knot develops in your stomach. You sleep very little 
that night, thinking of Carl's reaction to the answer you must give 
him. 
In Promenade Towers Mutual Housing Corp. v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co., I the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the 
1. 324 Md. 588, 597 A.2d 1377 (1991) (Promenade /I). 
298 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 22 
rule of "perfect tender in time," under which, absent statute, con-
tractual provisions, or agreements to the contrary, a mortgagor does 
not have the right to payoff a mortgage loan prior to the maturity 
date specified within the loan contract.2 Although for years generally 
considered to be the common law in Maryland,) the rule had never 
been expressly adopted by the court. 
The note that you used for Carl's loan from John Walker did 
not contain a prepayment clause. 4 This silence is fatal to Carl's desire 
to pay the loan off early unless Walker cooperates. Carl may be able 
to make payoff more attractive to Walker by offering to pay an 
additional lump sum amount, commonly called a prepayment pre-
mium or penalty. You could have included such a provision in the 
original note. At that time, Walker's primary concern was to sell his 
building; he probably would not have objected to a reasonable 
prepayment option. Unfortunately for Carl, at this time Walker is 
most concerned with maintaining the income stream he has become 
dependent on, and Walker now has bargaining superiority. 
The concept that one does not inherently have the right to payoff 
debt at will may be foreign to many people. Consumer lending laws5 
2. [d. at 603, 597 A.2d at 1384. The rule of ~'perfect tender in time" is the 
general or majority rule in this country. See, e.g., 3 RICHARD R. POWELL, 
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY , 46O[3][f] (1993); 55 AM. lUR. 2D Mortgages 
§ 397 (1971); 59 C.l.S. Mortgages § 447(a) (1949). The converse of this rule is 
referred to as the civil law rule or as a presumption of prepayment. The civil 
law rule considers the maturity date to be for the benefit of the debtor only, 
and allows the debtor to prepay at will, thus creating a presumption that the 
debtor may prepay the loan unless the contract specifies otherwise. Promenade 
II, 324 Md. at 600, 597 A.2d at 1383. 
3. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 602, 597 A.2d at 1384 (citing HYMAN GINSBERG & 
ISIDORE GINSBERG, MORTGAGES AND OTHER LIENS IN MARYLAND 236 (1936); 
HERBERT TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 537, 
at 1235 n.276 (1912». 
4. Such a clause sets forth the right, if any, of the borrower to prepay, along 
with any charges or penalties due in the event that right is. exercised. If no 
prepayment clause is included, leaving the loan contract silent on the issue of 
prepayment, the rule of "perfect tender in time" will apply unless a statute 
grants the right to prepay. 
5. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-S0S(e) (1990) ("A buyer may prepay 
at any time, without penalty, all or any part of the outstanding balance of a 
closed end [retail credit] account."); id. § 12-612(b) ("A buyer may prepay at 
any time, without penalty, all or part of the outstanding balance payable under 
an installment sale agreement relating to consumer goods."); id. § 12-620(a) 
("[A] buyer may prepay at any time, without penalty, all or any part of the 
unpaid balance payable under the installment sale agreement if such agreement 
is for the retail sale of personal property purchased primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes .... "); id. § 12-635(a) ("A sales finance com-
pany shall permit a buyer to prepay in full or in part at any time, without 
penalty, the outstanding balance payable under a renewal, extension, or refund 
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and tbe policies of many purchasers of residential mortgage loans6 
serve to insulate most lending transactions from the common law 
rule. Within a transaction subject to the rule, laymen and lawyers 
not familiar with commercial real estate and lending law may likely 
be under the impression that negotiation of a prepayment clause is 
in furtherance of the lender's desire to limit the borrower's right to 
prepay, rather than the creation of that right for the borrower. 
This Comment first reviews the Promenade Towers opinion, 
which involves an examination of an interesting line of Revolutionary 
War era cases. The Comment then explores the legal bases for the 
rule of perfect tender in time and the arguments both in support of 
and critical of its operation. Finally, the Comment discusses issues 
related to the validity and enforcement of contractual agreements 
providing for prepayment limitations and penalties. 
I. PROMENADE TOWERS MUTUAL HOUSING CORP. v. 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan) was the 
holder of a consolidated note and deed of trust securing indebtedness 
of approximately $23 million on The Promenade, an apartment 
complex in Montgomery County, Maryland. 7 At the time of suit, 
agreement."); id. § 12-1009(a) ("A consumer borrower may prepay a loan in 
full at any time. "). 
As a result of the Promenade Towers decision, the General Assembly of 
Maryland enacted § 12-126 of the Commercial Law Code, which, in regard to 
a loan "secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on the borrower's primary 
residence" that "is not a commercial loan," provides that "[e]xcept to the 
extent provided otherwise in the loan contract, a borrower may prepay all or 
part of the outstanding unpaid indebtedness under [the] loan at any time." 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-126 (Supp. 1993). 
6. No prepayment penalty may be charged on FHA and VA loans. See 24 C.F.R. 
§ 203.22(b) (1993) (requiring FHA mortgages to allow prepayment in whole or 
in part without payment of a prepayment charge); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4211(c) 
(1993) (requiring that the debtor on a VA loan have the "right, without penalty 
or fee, to prepay all or not less than one installment of the indebtedness at 
any time"). FHLMC and FNMA do not purchase loans that contain prepay-
ment penalty provisions. See ROBERT KRATOvn & RAYMOND J. WERNER, 
MODERN MORTGAGE LAW & PRACTICE § 34.04(c) (2d ed. 1981). 
7. This note and deed of trust represented the consolidation of two prior notes 
and deeds of trust. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Promenade Towers Mut. 
HOlls. Corp., 84 Md. App. 702, 706, 581 A.2d 846, 848 (1990) (Promenade 
I). The original parties to the lending transactions were Landcon Associates 
Phase One and Continental Illinois Realty. At the time of. consolidation in 
1975, Continental's interest had been assigned to Metropolitan R. Extract at 
E2-E3, Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
324 Md. 588, 597 A.2d 1371 (1991) (Promenade II) (No. 91-2) [hereinafter 
Record Extract]. 
300 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 22 
The Promenade was owned by Promenade Towers Mutual Housing 
Corporation (PTMHC). The consolidated note and deed of trust had 
been modified in 1980 (the First Modification) and in 1986 (the 
Second Modification).8 The First Modification established an interest 
rate of 141170, expressly prohibited prepayment until July 1, 1989, and 
allowed prepayment without penalty after that date.9 The Second 
Modification reduced the interest rate to 11.875%, with payments to 
be made until September 1996, at which time the remaining balance 
would be due in full. There was no mention of prepayment in the 
Second Modification. 1O The entire note was completely restated as 
amended within each Modification. 1I The Second Modification ad-
ditionally recited that the "[b]orrower hereby confirms and reaffirms 
the terms, covenants and conditions of the Consolidated Note, as 
amended hereby." Paragraph eight of the Second Modification states 
the following: 
That except as amended hereby, nothing herein contained 
invalidates or shall impair or release any covenant, condi-
tion, agreement or stipulation in the Consolidated Note as 
previously amended and Consolidated Deed of Trust as 
previously amended, and the same, except as amended hereby, 
shall continue to be in full force and effect .... "12 
In January 1989, PTMHC informed Metropolitan of its intent 
to exercise the prepayment privilege granted in the First Modifica-
tion. 13 In response, Metropolitan asserted" that the Second Modifi-
The facts as presented here are a compilation of information provided by 
the opinions of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, Promenade [, 84 
Md. App. at 705-07, 581 A.2d at 848-49, and the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, Promenade II, 324 Md. at 590-92, 597 A.2d at 1378-79. This 
information is supplemented with information provided in the Complaint, 
Record Extract, supra, at EI-E8, that was not contested in the Answer, Record 
Extract, supra; at E47-E52. 
8. Promenade [, 84 Md. App. at 706, 581 A.2d at 848. The First Modification 
was between Promenade Associates, successor to Landcon Associates, and 
Metropolitan; the Second Modification was between PTMHC, successor in title 
to Promenade Associates, and Metropolitan. Record Extract, supra note 7, at 
E4. 
9. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 590, 597 A.2d at 1378. The interest rate was flXed 
until June 1990. [d. From July 1990 until maturity in June 2005, the rate was 
adjustable, subject to a 14070 floor. [d. The prepayment privilege required an 
irrevocable 60 day written notice and payment of interest through the date of 
" prepayment. [d. 
10. [d. at 591, 597 A.2d at 1378. 
11. [d.; see also Record Extract, supra note 7, at E9-E44 (providing a copy of 
each Modification). 
12. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 591, 597 A.2d at 1378. 
13. [d. at 591, 597 A.2d at 1379. 
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cation extinguished that privilege.14 PTMHC then sought a declaratory 
judgment and an injunction requiring Metropolitan to accept pre-
payment after July 1989.JS 
The issue presented to the trial court was whether the prepayment 
terms of the First Modification were incorporated by reference into 
the Second Modification through the use of the reaffirmation and 
continuance clauses, or whether the terms of the Second Modification 
completely superseded those of the First, leaving the contract silent 
on the issue of prepayment and thereby precluding PTMHC from 
prepayment at will. Although both parties recognized that there was 
no statutory or case law on point in Maryland, the initial pleadings 
and motions did not challenge the applicability of the general rule 
as to silence on the issue of prepayment. 16 Thus, the initial question 
presented to the court was one of pure contract interpretation. 
The trial court granted summary judgment to PTMHC, holding 
that the First Modification was "not extinguished, but rather by 
specific language in the second modification survive[d] and [was] 
incorporated by reference" to the extent that there was not conflict, 
and that silence in the Second Modification did not eliminate the 
right of prepayment granted in the First Modification. 17 Acknowl-
edging the gap in Maryland law and desiring to preserve all issues 
for appeal, the court additionally held that even if the Second 
Modification did not incorporate the prepayment privilege of the 
First Modification, there is a right to prepay absent language in the 
contract precluding prepayment. 18 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the trial 
court on both issues. 19 The court first addressed the issue of con-
tractual silence as to prepayment. The court reviewed the majority 
14. [d. at 591-92, 597 A.2d at 1379. 
15. [d. 
16. Metropolitan acknowledged the lack of a Maryland statute or case law and 
placed weight on the fact that a "majority of neighboring jurisdictions" follow 
the majority rule with only one nearby jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, holding to 
the contrary. Record Extract, supra note 7, at E77, E79 (citing case law from 
New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Delaware, and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to support the 
majority rule). While agreeing that Metropolitan accurately stated the majority 
rule, PTMHC maintained that the rule was inapplicable because the prepayment 
provisions in the First Modification survived the Second Modification. [d. at 
E115. 
17. [d. at E150-E151 (ruling of the court). 
18. [d. at EI51-EI53. The judge chose to rule in this fashion to "eliminate the 
necessity of cross appeals in order to preserve that issue," despite the fact that 
he considered the decision to be "adverse[] to what I believe the law is and is 
going to be." [d. 
19. "Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp., 84 Md. 
App. 702, 581 A.2d 846 (1990) (Promenade I). 
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rule of perfect tender in time2° and the minority rule granting the 
right to prepay absent express preclusion. 21 The few Maryland cases 
relating to the prepayment issue, although not directly on point, were 
discussed and determined to be consistent with the majority rule. 22 
Finally, quoting a Washington State opinion to the effect that changes 
in this area were more appropriately handled by the legislature than 
the judiciary, the court adopted the majority rule. 23 The court then 
quickly dealt with the issue of contract interpretation. The court 
found that the Second Modification was not ambiguous and that the 
terminology used should be given its ordinary meaning. The Modi-
fication stated that "[t}he Consolidated Note is hereby modified and 
amended . . . [and} shall read and be deemed to read in full" as set 
forth. As "amended" includes deletion and "in full" means "com-
plete," the prepayment provision of the First Modification was 
excluded from the Second Modification. 24 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the decision of the 
court of special appeals.25 After reviewing the application of the rule 
of perfect tender in time to both mortgage and land installment 
contracts throughout the United States, the court discussed the prec-
edential value of three cases decided by the court of appeals in the 
1790's in favor of a defendant named Whetcroft.26 
In the first two of these cases, two creditors, McHard and 
Quynn, sued for payment ori bonds issued by Whetcroft on Septem-
ber 24, 1778 in the amounts of 442 pounds and 10 shillings, plus 
interest, due "at or upon" September 1, 1788.27 Whetcroft pleaded 
that the debt had been paid28 based upon his tenders on March 7, 
20. Id. at 708-10, 581 A.2d at 849-50. 
21. Id. at 710-13, 581 A.2d at 850-52. 
22. Id. at 714-15, 581 A.2d at 852-53. 
23. Id. at 715-16, 581 A.2d at 853. 
24. Id. at 716-18, 581 A.2d at 853-54. 
25. Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 324 Md. 
588, 591 A.2d 1377 (1991) (Promenade 11). 
26. Id. at 592-602,597 A.2d at 1380-84. These three cases are McHard v. Whetcroft, 
3 H. & McH. 85 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1791) (Whetcroft I); Quynn v. Whetcroft, 3 
H. & McH. 136 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1793) (Whetcroft IJ); and Quynn v. Whetcroft, 
3 H. & McH. 352 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1795) (Whetcroft III). Cases in Harris & 
McHenry are reported based upon the date the case was heard in the General 
Court (trial level). The trial and appellate decisions are combined. The amount 
of information provided varies, but usually includes some factual background, 
the decision, and sometimes an opinion of the general court, and the arguments 
presented before the appellate court. Often, an appellate court opinion is not 
provided. Thus, the holding of the appellate court must be inferred based upon 
the judgment rendered and the arguments presented. 
27. Whetcroft I, 3 H. & McH. at 85; Whetcroft II, 3 H. & McH. at 136; see also 
Promenade II, 324 Md. at 599, 597 A.2d at 1382. 
28. Whetcroft I, 3 H. & McH. at 85; Whetcroft II, 3 H. & McH. at 136; see also 
Promenade II, 324 Md. at 599, 597 A.2d at 1382. 
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1781 of $1,175.67 payment on each bond in the form of bills of 
credit issued by the State of Maryland, which had been refused by 
the creditors. 29 The general court rendered a verdict for the creditors 
in both cases.30 On appeal, the creditors' attorney argued that the 
court should apply the common law rule that a payment or tender 
made by the debtor before the date specified by contract is ineffectual 
unless accepted by the creditor. 31 Whetcroft's attorney argued for 
application of the civil law rule that a distant day of payment is for 
the benefit of the debtor, not the creditor.32 The court of appeals, 
deciding both cases in the June term of 1794, reversed both general 
court judgments. 33 
Believing these reversals to signify that the court of appeals 
allowed prepayment, Professor Frank S. Alexander cited the Whet-
croft line of cases in his seminal article on mortgage prepayment34 
to support his thesis that the rule of perfect tender in time is of 
relatively recent development without settled historical foundation. 35 
In turn, PTMHC asserted that the cases represented undisturbed 
precedent establishing that Maryland follows the minority rule. 36 Both 
Alexander's treatment and PTMHC's assertion rely upon the deci-
sions in the first two Wheteroft cases (Wheteroft I and Wheteroft 
II), and are based on the premise that decisions in the defendant's 
favor mean that the court adopted the defendant's argument. That 
Maryland follows the minority rule and permits prepayment is a 
logical conclusion drawn from reading Wheteroft I and II. 
The court of appeals, however, looked to the third Wheteroft 
case (Wheteroft III) and developed an equally plausible alternative 
explanation for the Wheteroft decisions. 37 The court first established 
the historical context in which these Wheteroft cases were decided. 
An act of the February 1777 session of the Maryland General 
29. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 599-600, 597 A.2d at 1382-83. 
30. Whetcro/t I, 3 H. & McH. at 85; Whetcro/t II, 3 H. & McH. at 137; see also 
Promenade II, 324 Md. at 599, 597 A.2d at 1382. 
31. Whetcro/t I, 3 H. & McH. at 87-88; see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 599-
600, 597 A.2d at 1382-83. 
32. Whetcro/t I, 3 H. & McH. at 88-90; Whetcro/t II, 3 H. & McH. at 137-38; 
see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 600, 597 A.2d at 1382-83. 
33. Whetcro/t I, 3 H. & McH. at 91; Whetcro/t II, 3 H. & McH. at 139; see also 
Promenade II, 324 Md. at 600, 597 A.2d at 1382-83. 
34. Frank S. Alexander, Mortgage Prepayment: The Trial 0/ Common Sense, 72 
CORNELL L. REv. 288, 302-03 (1987). 
35. [d. at 290-308. Alexander ends his historical analysis with the conclusion that 
"rc]ontrary to traditional wisdom, the common law prior to 1825 did not 
clearly deny the debtor the right to prepay hjs mortgage." [d. at 308. For 
Alexander's discussion of the Whetcro/t cases, see id. at 302-03, 305-06. 
36. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 595, 597 A.2d at 1380. 
37. [d. at 601-02, 597 A.2d at 1383-84. 
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Assembly (the 1777 Act) provided that as of April 20, 1777, bills of 
credit issued by Congress or by the state would be legal tender within 
the state for payment of all types of debt.38 In addition, the 1777 
Act provided that a creditor refusing bills of credit tendered in 
payment of a debt would be barred from suit on that debt and the 
debt would be extinguished. 39 A debtor, having tendered and been 
refused, was entitled to plead payment and introduce the 1777 Act 
as evidence.4O Acts such as these were passed by many states to help 
stabilize economies hard hit by inflation during the Revolutionary 
War.41 Unfortunately, the bills of credit legalized by the 1777 Act 
were just as susceptible to inflation as the currency they replaced; 
thus, during the October 1779 legislative session the bills were ordered 
out of circulation as of March 20, 1781.42 This 1779 Act provided 
for exchange of the old bills of credit for new currency at a rate of 
forty to one.43 Whetcroft's March 7, 1781 tenders to his creditors 
were made with the old, devalued bills of credit.44 
The evidence provided in Whetcroft III established that Whet-
croft had tendered, in succession, the exact same bills to creditor 
Quynn as payment for each of three bonds held by Quynn; each 
tender was refused. 4s Plaintiff Quynn argued that the tenders should 
be valid against the first bond only and should not operate to 
extinguish more debt than money tendered.46 The general court ruled 
that because refusal of tender operated as payment so as to extinguish 
the debt, the same money might then be used again to tender on the 
second debt, and if again refused, to tender on the third-each tender 
and refusal operating to discharge the debt tendered against with no 
further obligation to the creditor,47 
On appeal, Luther Martin,48 representing Quynn, contended that 
the 1777 Act "established a new principle" in that it "made a tender 
38. Id. at 596-97, 597 A.2d at 1381. 
39. Id. at 597, 597 A.2d at 1381. 
4O.Id. 
41. Id. at 598, 597 A.2d at 1382. 
42.Id. 
43.Id. 
44. Id. at 599, 597 A.2d at 1382. 
45. Quynn v. Whetcroft, 3 H. & McH. 352, 352-53 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1795) (Whetcroft 
Ill); see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 600, 597 A.2d at 1383. 
46. Whetcroft III, 3 H. & McH. at 353; see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 600, 
597 A.2d at 1383. 
47. Whetcroft III, 3 H. & McH. at 353; see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 600, 
597 A.2d at 1383. 
48. Luther Martin was one of the preeminent Maryland lawyers of the time. His 
career has been summarized as follows: 
MARTIN, Luther. 17481-1826. American lawyer and public official, b. 
near New Brunswick, N.J. Practiced in Maryland (from c. 1772); first 
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of money, and a refusal to receive, a payment . . . of the same 
effect as if the money had been received," thus deprivin·g the creditor 
of his debt.49 Martin then argued that, having had the debt extin-
guished upon tender, the creditor should now be entitled at least to 
the money previously tendered and refused, "which by law has been 
forced upon him as an equivalent for [the debt] which was his due. "SO 
Without recorded opinion, the court of appeals reversed the judgment 
of the general court.51 
The (modern) court of appeals posited that the reversals in 
Whetcroft I and II may not have represented the adoption of the 
civil law rule allowing prepayment at the debtor's will. These reversals 
instead could indicate the court's decision that a refused tender would 
have the effect of payment arid would consequentially operate as the 
creditor's acceptance of prepayment,which under the common law 
extinguished a debt whether or not the debtor had the right to 
prepay.52 
attorney general of Maryland (1778-1805). Member, Continental Con-
gress (1785) and Federal Constitutional Convention (1787); opposed 
plan of strong central government and adoption of Constitution. 
Defended Samuel Chase in impeachment trial before U.S. Senate 
(1804) and Aaron Burr in treason trial in Richmond, Va. (1807). 
Chief judge, court of oyer and terminer, Baltimore (1813-16); again 
attorney general of Maryland (1818-22); losing prosecutor in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland case (1819). 
WEBSTER'S NEW BIOGRAPmCAL DICTIONARY 659 (1988). 
49. Whetcrojt III, 3 H. & McH. at 355; see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 600, 
597 A.2d at 1383. 
50. Whetcrojt III, 3 H. & McH. at 356; see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 601, 
597 A.2d at 1383. 
51. Whetcrojt III, 3 H. & McH. at 356; see also Promenade II, 324 Md. at 601, 
597 A.2d at 1383. 
52. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 601-02, 597 A.2d at 1383-84. In a footnote, the 
court observed that Whetcrojt II seemed to involve a parol evidence issue that 
qlst little light on the issue at hand. Id. at 596 n.2, 597 A.2d at 1381 n.2. 
Whetcrojt II does, however, appear to fit well with the hypothesis of the court. 
The Whetcrojt II general court report indicates that Whetcroft offered to prove 
a tender made in bills of credit before the date of payment specified in the 
bond, and that such tender was a legal tender under the Act. Quynn v. 
Whetcroft, 3 H. & McH. 136, 136-37 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1793) (Whetcrojt II). The 
general court held that evidence would not be admitted to prove the facts 
proffered because "no tender is legal, or can be admitted to be proved, before 
the day of payment mentioned in the condition of the bond." Id. at 137. The 
general court further held that the Act of October 1780 was of "no relation 
to continental contracts, where the date of payment was after the continental 
money was called out of circulation." Id. 
On appeal, Whetcroft's attorney argued for the application of the civil 
law on prepayment; Luther Martin, for Quynn, argued against the admission 
of parol evidence. Id. at 137-39. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. 
Id. at 139. The remand proceedings and subsequent appeal are reported as 
306 Baltimore Law Review (Vol. 22 
The court of appeals thus held that the Whetcroft cases did not 
represent adoption of the civil law rule in Maryland, leaving Mary-
land's case law devoid of appellate precedent directly addressing the 
issue of a mortgagor's right to prepay.53 The court noted, however, 
that authorities on Maryland law, in accord with general treatises, 
have long espoused perfect tender in time as the applicable rule in 
Maryland.54 The court further found the holding in a 1950 case 
involving a disputed land sale contract to imply that Maryland 
followed the common law rule.55 The court also cited the recent 
enactment of Commercial Law section 12-126, which grants the right 
to prepay on non-commercial loans secured by the borrower's primary 
residence, as representing the legislature's acknowledgement that Mar-
yland follows the rule of perfect tender in time. 56 On these bases, 
Whetero/t III. On remand, the general court instructed the jury that the same 
money, tendered and refused on three different debts, operated to extinguish 
each debt. Whetero/t /II, 3 H. & McH. at 353. Whetcroft's invocation of the 
Act in Whetero/t /I; the significant change in the rulings of the general court 
between Whetero/t /I and Whetero/t 1/1; and Luther Martin's focus upon the 
effect of the Act in arguments before the court of appeals in Whetero/t 1/1, 
combine to lend credibility to the theory that the decisions of the court of 
appeals in Whetero/t I and /I were based upon interpretation of the Act rather 
than upon an adoption of the civil law rule on prepayment. 
53. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 602, 597 A.2d at 1383-84. 
54. Id. at 602, 597 A.2d at 1384. 
55. Id. at 602-03, 597 A.2d at 1384. Meinecke v. Goedeke, 195 Md. 373, 73 A.2d 
445 (1950), involved a sale of 20 acres of land for $5000, at 6% interest, with 
payments of $50/month. Upon payment in full, the sellers were to execute a 
deed to the purchasers. Id. at 378, 73 A.2d at 446. Apparently there was 
neither a maturity date, nor a provision for prepayment in the contract. The 
contract was voidable at the sellers' option on 30 days default by the sellers. 
Id. After having fallen several months behind in payment, the buyers gave the 
sellers' attorney sufficient funds to bring the contract current. Id. at 380, 73 
A.2d at 447. The attorney held the money while the parties argued about 
whether the contract had been voided. The buyers sued for specific perform-
ance, requiring the sellers to accept either the remaining monthly payments or 
the full remaining balance. Id. at 380-81, 73 A.2d at 447. 
The court of appeals affirmed a circuit court decree ordering performance 
of the contract as written, citing the sellers' refusal of the lump sum. Id. at 
382-83, 73 A.2d at 448. The Promenade /I court read this holding to mean 
that "[i)mplicitly, the purchasers had no right to prepay." Promenade /I, 324 
Md. at 603, 597 A.2d at 1384. 
56. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 603, 597 A.2d at 1384 (citing MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW § 12-126 (Supp. 1991». This statute was introduced in direct response 
to the court of special appeals decision in the Promenade I case. See Act of 
May 14, 1991, ch. 409, 1991 Md. Laws 2499, 2499 (deleted "Whereas" clause). 
This timing somewhat weakens the court of appeals' use of the statute to 
support its finding that Maryland has long followed the common law rule of 
perfect tender in time. Regardless of the opinions of various authorities as to 
the state of Maryland law prior to the court of special appeals' ruling in 
Promenade I, the law in Maryland became the rule of perfect tender in time 
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the court held that "under Maryland common law, a mortgagor or 
grantor under a deed of trust payable at a fixed date or dates in the 
future, does not have a right to prepay, absent a provision for 
prepayment in the loan contract. "57 The court declined PTMHC's 
invitation to change Maryland common law by adopting the minority 
rule. The court was neither persuaded by the reasoning of jurisdic-
tions that have done so, nor willing to extend the presumption of 
prepayment beyond the line so recently drawn by the legislature in 
its enactment of Commercial Law section 12-126.58 
II. PERFECT TENDER IN TIME 
The rule of "perfect tender in time," considered to be the 
general or majority rule59 regarding mortgage prepayment. It is 
recognized60 as having its documented roots in two mid-nineteenth 
century cases, Abbe v. Goodwin,61 an 1829 American case, and 
Brown v. Co/e,62 an 1845 English case. The Abbe court rested its 
refusal to allow early payment of two notes secured by a mortgage 
on the premises that allowing the prepayment would amount to a 
reformation of the mortgage contract, and that allowing the mort-
gagor to compel the mortgagee to accept early payment would be 
akin to allowing the mortgagee to require the mortgagor to make 
payment before maturity.63 The Brown court based its decision to 
deny the mortgagor of a leasehold interest the right to repay a one 
year note four months early upon the "inconvenience" such a practice 
would impose upon mortgagees, who, the court said, "generally 
advance their money as. an investment."64 Neither court cited prece-
dent to support its reasoning or holding. Subsequently, other courts 
throughout this country began to make similar determinations, either 
citing to Abbe and Brown,65 or, as did the courts in those cases, 
after that decision. The enactment of § 12-126 might then be viewed as a 
reaction to what the legislature perceived as a change in the law. 
57. Promenade II, 324 Md. at 603, 597 A.2d at 1384. 
58. [d. at 604-06, 597 A.2d at 1384-85. The court also affirmed the court of special 
appeals on the issue of contract interpretation, finding that the prepayment 
clause of the First Modification was not incorporated into the Second Modi-
fication. [d. at 606-10, 597 A.2d at 1386-87. 
59. See Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 324 
Md. 588, 597 A.2d 1377 (1991) (Promenade 11). 
60. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 422 
(2d ed. 1985); Alexander, supra note 34, at 291. 
61. 7 Conn. 377 (1829). 
62. 14 L.J.-Ch. 167 (1845). 
63. Abbe, 7 Conn. at 384. 
64. Brown, 14 L.J.-Ch. at 168, quoted in Alexander, supra note 34, at 292; NELSON 
& WHITMAN, supra note 60, at 422. 
65. See cases cited in Alexander, supra note 34, at 292 n.19. 
308 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 22 
after a general discussion without support of authority. 66 By the early 
twentieth century, the rule of perfect tender in time was well estab-
lished as common law in America. 67 
The Abbe and Brown decisions reveal a dichotomy in the ra-
tionales used to support the rule of perfect tender in time. Abbe 
represents a contract interpretation approach; Brown represents a 
policy approach. Under either position, advocates of the rule view 
the note as an investment vehicle for the lender. 
There are two facets to the contract-based rationale. The first 
operates upon the premise that a loan contract that specifies loan 
amount, interest rate, term, and payments, is complete. 68 The note 
is a contract under which the borrower, who has been advanced an 
amount of money by the lender, agrees to repay that money under 
certain conditions, generally over a certain period of time during 
which interest on the unpaid balance must be paid. Time is thus an 
important part of the creditor's expectation.69 The borrower. has 
received the benefit of the bargain-the use of the creditor's money. 
A presumption of prepayment would deprive the creditor of his 
benefit-the interest income for the term of the loan. A presumption 
of prepayment in essence gives the debtor the right to unilaterally 
change the term provision.70 Any right, such as the right to prepay-
ment, which gives one party the right to alter the contract at will 
without approval of the other party, should be expressly given, not 
implied in law. 71 
66. See, e.g., Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 51 N.E. 309, 
312 (N.Y. 1898) (denying a petition for early retirement of a bond issue secured 
by a mortgage on the basis that as "[t)he outstanding bondholders have a 
right to receive their debt only as provided by the contract ... [t)he obligation 
of the debtor is to pay the principal when it becomes due, and he has no right 
to compel the creditor to accept payment until it becomes due" without citing 
to authority); see also Ellis J. Harmon, Comment, Secured Real Estate Loan 
Prepayment and the Prepayment Penalt/. 51 CAL. L. REv. 923, 924 n.7 (1963) 
(indicating that the prohibition against payment of a mortgage debt prior to 
maturity "apparently based on the principle that a contract is enforceable 
according to its terms, seems to have been adopted by the California Supreme 
Court without discussion or citation of authority"). . 
67. See Alexander, supra note 34, at 290-93, 308-10. 
68. See F.D.I.C. v. Rusconi, 808 F. Supp. 30, 41-42 (D. Me. 1992) (finding that 
absence of prepayment provision does not create ambiguity). 
69. See, e.g., Peryer v. Pennock, 115 A. lOS, 105 (Vt. 1921) ("The time of payment 
fixed by the terms of a pecuniary obligation is a material provision, and each 
party has the right to stand on the letter of the agreement and perform 
accordingly."). By contrast, the civil law rule presumes that the term provision 
of a note is for the benefit of the obligor, and thus may be waived by the 
obligor, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Spillman v. Spillman, 509 
So. 2d 442 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
70. Arthur v. Burkich, 520 N.Y.S.2d 638, 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
71. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp., 84 
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The second contract-based rationale is grounded in the concept 
of redprocity.72 In Whetcroft's time, the investment risk was a 
fluctuating currency. McHard's attorney stated the creditor's argu-
ment well: 
[Y]ou [the debtor] shall not tie my hands and be at liberty 
to speculate on me and pay me at the lowest state of 
depreciation to which paper money may be reduced; but as 
you take the chance of a fall, give me the chance of its 
rising in value. 73 
The modern investment risk in a long term lending transaction is 
fluctuating interest rates. The creditor takes the chance that interest 
rates will rise, the debtor that interest rates will fall. Absent an 
express contractual provision, the creditor is not permitted to demand 
payment before it is due. On the same basis, the debtor should not 
be allowed to anticipate the maturity date unless this right has been 
provided in the note. 74 
Other rationales for allowing the lender to refuse prepayment, 
focus on policy considerations. 7s One argument for permitting the 
lender to refuse prepayment is that the interest rate charged is, in 
part, calculated to recoup the lender's up-front costs over the term 
of the loan, so that early repayment would prevent the lender from 
fully recovering these up-front costS.76 Further, prepayment could 
result in additional unexpected costs related to reinvesting the funds 
Md. App. 702, 714, 581 A.2d 846, 852 (1990) (Promenade l) (citing Vincent 
v. Palmer, 179 Md. 365, 372, 19 A.2d 183, 188-90 (1941), for the proposition 
that "a party to a contract does not have any unilateral right to modify, and 
courts may not redraft, an agreement merely because it turns out to be 
disadvantageous"). 
72. See Alexander, supra note 34, at 307-08, 317-19; see also Alan M. Weinberger, 
Neither an Early Nor a Late Payor Be?-Presuming to Question the Presump-
tion Against Mortgage Prepayment, 35 WAYNE L. REv. I, 5 (1988). 
73. McHard v. Whetcroft, 3 H. & McH. 85, 86-87 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1791) (Whetcroft 
l); see also Brown v. Cole, 14 L.J.-Ch. 167 (1845) (acknowledging that allowing 
prepayment "might be the cause of much loss to the [mortgagee), by the funds 
falling during the time"), quoted in Alexander, supra note 34, at 292 n.18. 
74. Alexander argues that the modern concept of reciprocity of contract terms is 
actually a misconstruction of early decisions requiring reciprocity of remedies, 
whereby upon payment, the mortgagor has the right to redeem his property, 
and upon failure of payment, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose. 
Alexander, supra note 34, at 307-08. 
75. These economic arguments are also advanced to justify the imposition of 
prepayment charges. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 60, at 423; Robert 
K. Baldwin, Note, Prepayment Penalties: A Survey and Suggestion, 40 V AND. 
L. REv. 409, 414-15 (1987); Michael T. McNelis, Comment, Prepayment 
Penalties and Due-on-Sale Clauses in Commercial Mortgages: What Next?, 20 
IND. L. REv. 735, 747-48 (1987). 
76. Weinberger, supra note 72, at 14-15. 
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received prior to maturity. 77 This type of argument generally is not 
well received, due to the usual lending practice of charging origination 
and processing fees to cover these costS.78 
Other economic arguments center on the lender's management 
of its loan portfolio. Generally, an institutional lender, such as a 
bank, savings and loan, or insurance company, ties the interest paid 
by the institution on its obligations, such as savings, certificates of 
deposit, and annuities, to the income received by the institution on 
its investments, including its mortgage portfolio. It is argued that 
without the ability to control prepayments, the lender will lose the 
ability to effectively maintain its portfolio yield.79 As noted by one 
commentator, "[p]resumptive nonprepayment and prepayment prem-
iums protect and compensate lenders if they lose their anticipated 
and bargained-for rate of return when borrowers prepay high interest 
rate loans during low interest rate periods." so 
Conversely, decisions and arguments supporting a presumptive 
right to prepay tend to focus on a property analysis. In Mahoney v. 
Furches,S) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the relevant 
policy considerations and determined that, in view of the importance 
of free alienability of property, there should be a presumptive ability 
to prepay, which could be refuted only by contract provisions or a 
manifestation of mutual intent to the contrary.82 The implication that 
77. Weinberger, supra; note 72, at 14-15; Alexander, supra note 34, at 311-12. 
78. Weinberger, supra note 72, at 14. 
79. See Weinbarger, supra, note 72 at 15-18; Alexander, supra note 34, at 312-17. 
80. Weinberger, supra note 72, at 15. It could be argued that use of sophisticated 
prepayment clauses that calculate a prepayment premium based upon current 
market conditions would allow lenders to address this risk without resorting 
to a presumptive prohibition against prepayment. Such provisions "calculate 
the prepayment premium based on the prevailing market interest rate at the 
time of prepayment, and the remaining term of the loan prior to maturity." 
Weinberger, supra, note 72, at 17. By using such clauses, the lender is able to 
protect itself against the portfolio-management risk without relying upon an 
absolute prohibition against prepayment. This argument that the lender should 
use a prepayment premium that is tailored to the market interest rate to some 
extent begs the question because it does not address the issue of the silent 
document. What the argument implies, however, is that the lender should be 
responsible for including such a clause, and should be the party to suffer if 
omitted. At least one recent decision recognized that the mortgagee is the usual 
drafter of the instruments in question; and thus, a presumption of a right to 
prepayment "would not work a hardship on the mortgagee." Mahoney v. 
Furches, 468 A.2d 458, 461 (pa. 1983). 
81. 468 A.2d 458 (Pa. 1983). 
82. [d. at 460-61. The court considered that the effect on alienability of land was 
the "dominant" consideration, as "the fundamental purpose of the mortgage 
note in most instances is to secure a debt incurred in the purchase of land 
from which the debt arises rather than to secure investment income for the 
mortgagee." [d. at 461. Obviously, this concern about the alienability of land 
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prepayment may be prohibited by agreement weakens the alienability 
argument because, as pointed out by the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland in Promenade I, "an invalid restraint on alienation is 
generally determined by the nature of the restraint, not by the manner 
in which the restraint is created [and] the unreasonableness, if any, 
of a restraint exists whether if is written or presumed. "83 The alien-
ability argument is also undermined by the fact that although the 
prepayment prohibition may make the transfer of the property less 
economically feasible or less attractive to potential purchasers, it does 
not actually prevent alienation.84 
focuses upon the debtor's perspective rather than upon the lender's, and ignores 
the fact that these two purposes of a mortgage note, to secure a debt and to 
secure investment income, may exist concurrently. See Promenade Towers Mut. 
Hous. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 324 Md. 588,604, 597 A.2d 1377, 
1385 (1991) (Promenade II). 
83. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp., 84 Md. 
App. 702, 712, 581 A.2d 846, 851 (1990) (Promenade I). The Pennsylvania 
court's apparent deference to the parties' agreement is diminished by its 
approving reference to a lower court's conclusion 
that, consistent with the policy against restraints on alienation, even 
where the mortgage explicitly states there is no right to prepay the 
note, if the mortgagor can provide the mortgagee with the benefit of 
his bargain under the terms of the note, he will be allowed to have 
a release of his land following the substitution of security or other 
arrangement. 
Mahoney, 468 A.2d at 461 n.1. The alienability argument highlights the security 
aspect of the mortgage transaction. Although the debt is often created in order 
to facilitate the acquisition of the property, the debt is technically separable 
from the property given as security. This severability of the debt from the 
property is the basis for a "simple solution," proposed by Professor Alexander 
to resolve the prepayment issue: The mortgagor obtains a release from a 
mortgagee refusing prepayment by purchasing an annuity guarantying the 
payments specified in the note. Alexander, supra note 34, at 336-41. Two 
problems with Alexander's solution are that the loan is transformed from a 
secured to an unsecured status, and the creditworthiness of the annuitant is 
substituted for that of the mortgagor. That recourse to the property is an 
integral facet of the mortgage transaction is not addressed by Alexander's 
proposal. 
84. See Warrington 611 Assocs. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 705 F. Supp. 229, 236 
(D.N.J. 1989) (citing to cases holding "prepayment restrictions in the com-
mercial context [are) enforceable and not violative of the policy against res-
traints on alienation"); Connolley v. Harrison, 23 Md. App. 485, 490-91, 327 
A.2d 787, 790 (1974) (finding that neither a clause preventing prepayment for 
two years, nor a clause requiring a prepayment penalty after that time "violated 
the purpose for the rule against invalid restraints on alienation, i.e.,: neither 
clause made the property 'extra commercium"'); Patterson v. Tirollo, 581 
A.2d 74 (N.H. 1990) ("[T)he only restrictions placed on the plaintiffs were 
that they were unable to prepay their note, and they were prevented from 
having a subsequent grantee freely assume the mortgage held by the defendant. 
Nothing, however, precluded the plaintiffs from selling their property in fee 
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III. BREACH BY PREPAYMENT 
When the loan documents are silent on the issue of prepayment, 
or prohibit or limit prepayment, a borrower subject to the rule of 
perfect tender in time who wishes to prepay may find himself in a 
curious situation if the lender is not receptive to early payoff. The 
generally accepted remedy for breach of a loan contract by prepay-
ment is specific performance, that is, the borrower is required to 
continue payment according to the terms of the note.8S Thus, although 
it is a legal axiom that equitable relief is available only when there 
is an inadequate remedy at law,86 and a loan contract, being a 
contract for the payment of money, allows .for a calculation of 
damages having a virtual identity to performance, the borrower is 
not allowed to breach. Two Maryland cases, although not exactly 
on point, illustrate the risks to the borrower of non-existent, short-
sighted, or unartfully crafted prepayment rights. 
Abell v. Safe Deposit & Trust CO.87 involved 1000 serially 
numbered bonds with a par value of $1000 each, issued in January 
1910 by the A.S. Abell Company (the Company), and secured by an 
indenture of mortgage for $1,000,000 to Safe Deposit and Trust 
Company of Baltimore as Trustee. The mortgage provided for re-
demption of twenty bonds a year in serial number order, with 
redemption beginning in January 1915 and continuing each January 
thereafter until the last bonds matured in 1965.88 The redemption 
clause specifically mandated that "the Company shall have no right 
to pay any other bonds prior to maturity, except those hereafter 
provided to be redeemed out of the unused proceeds of insurance."89 
The insurance clause of the mortgage allowed the Company to apply 
proceeds "to the payment and redemption of said bonds in the order 
of their serial numbers."90 
Over the years, in addition to redemption according to the 
mortgage, the Company also purchased a number of bonds, so that 
simple at any time to whomever they chose. They would just not be able to 
give a warranty deed free from all encumbrances until after the two-year 
promissory note became due without the consent of the mortgagee. "); see also 
Baldwin, supra note 75, at 424 (discussing restraint on alienability challenges 
to prepayment premiums). 
85. See Weinberger, supra note 72, at 35 ("By enforcing the lender's right to 
refuse tender, the traditional . common law rule grants the lender specific 
performance. "). 
86. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) ("Specific perform-
ance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to 
protect the expectation interest of the injured party. "). 
87. 192 Md. 438, 64 A.2d 722 (1949). 
88. [d. at 441, 64 A.2d at 723. 
89. [d. 
90. [d. at 442, 64 A.2d at 724. 
1993] Mortgage Prepayment 313 
by the middle of 1947 there were only ninety-nine bonds outstand-
ing.91 At that time, approximately $108,000 in insurance proceeds 
from a fire in late 1946 were deposited with the Trustee.92 These 
funds were used to purchase an additional sixty-four bonds, leaving 
only thirty-five bonds outstanding, the majority of which were held 
by the plaintiffs, individuals of the Abell family.93 The Company 
attempted to redeem these remaining bonds under the insurance clause 
of the mortgage. Although the plaintiffs refused to surrender their 
bonds for redemption, the Trustee released the mortgage.94 
The court held that the Company did not have the right to 
redeem the plaintiffs' bonds, and that the Trustee's release of the 
mortgage was a violation of its fiduciary duty to the bondholders.95 
The mortgage was very specific on the terms of redemption and 
allowed for no deviation-the timing and order of redemption was 
controlled by the serial numbers on the bonds. The Company's 
purchase of bonds did not alter the scheme for redemption, and the 
purchased bonds could not be ignored in determining which bonds 
were eligible for redemption under either the redemption or the 
insurance clause of the mortgage.96 The court refused to reinstate the 
$1,000,000 mortgage to secure the plaintiffs' remaining thirteen bonds, 
however, stating that the injury to the defendants from such a remedy 
far outweighed the benefits to the plaintiffs. 97 
Of interest is the court's discussion regarding an appropriate 
remedy. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs were seeking specific 
performance of the mortgage contract, and that "courts of equity 
will not specifically enforce a contract unless ... the circumstances 
surrounding a given case appeal to the conscience of the court. "98 
In clearly identified dicta, the court ruminated on possible remedies 
of which the plaintiffs might avail themselves to enforce their con-
tractual right to hold their bonds until maturity and receive interest 
when due. A suggested-approach was an action at law or in foreclo-
sure for damages for breach of contract, "measured by the present 
value of a bond of the same quality, e.g., a U.S. bond, and the 




95. [d. at 446, 64 A.2d at 726. 
96. [d. at 444, 64 A.2d at 725. The last of plaintiffs' bonds would mature in 
January 1957. [d. at 446, 64 A.2d at 726. While sufficient to cover payment 
of all outstanding bonds, the insurance proceeds apparently were not sufficient 
to reach the plaintiffs' bonds when the approximately 200 intervening purchased 
but unredeemed bonds held by the company w~re considered. [d. 
97. [d. at 447-48, 64 A.2d at 726-27. 
98. [d. at 447, 64 A.2d at 726. 
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same 'yield' and maturity."99 But, the court said, "a court of equity 
will not devise a remedy by injunction, or in the nature of specific 
performance, which will harass or injure the Company and is not 
necessary to protect bondholders against any actual threatened im-
pairment of their security.' '100 
The Abell case was referred to in Pierson v. Pyles, 101 a case 
involving an installment land sales contract with payment provisions 
structured in such a fashion that despite fifteen years of payments, 
the contract balance was nearly $300 more than the original contract 
amount. 102 As. the Pierson court was deciding a complaint for a 
declaratory interpretation of a contract that had not been breached, 
however, it applied the equity principle that a court may not permit 
redrafting of the provisions of a contract in order to alleviate a bad 
bargain by one of the parties. 103 The court held that the purchasers 
must continue the monthly payments per the terms of the contract 
even though it would take an additional thirty-seven years to achieve 
unencumbered ownership.l04 The defendant, Pyles, was trustee for 
the estate of the seller, and the court cited the Abell case for the 
proposition that were Pyles to agree to a prepayment, he might be 
breaching a fiduciary duty to the " estate. IDS 
Thus, it seems that in Maryland, as the cooperation of either 
the lender, in which case there is no breach,l06 or the trustee, who 
risks suit for breach of fiduciary duty for accepting an unauthorized 
prepayment, is required in order to breach, and the assistance of the 
court cannot be drawn upon prior to an actual breach, the borrower, 
subject to the rule of perfect tender in time, is in the unusual position 
of being unable to breach the contract by prepayment. The alterna-
99. Id. at 448, 64 A.2d at 727. 
100. Id. 
101. 234 Md. 119, 197 A.2d 890 (1964). 
102. Id. at 121, 197 A.2d at 891. The contract, dated June 13, 1946, provided for 
a starting balance $14,935, interest at 4070, monthly payments of $65, with no 
right to anticipate payments. Id. Once the balance had decreased by $5000, a 
deed would be executed and a mortgage taken back on the same terms. Id. 
On these terms, the buyers would have been entitled to a deed in seven and 
one-half years, and the full balance would have been paid in slightly over 36 
years. However, the contract also provided for payment of taxes and insurance 
from the monthly payment. Id. Over the years, the tax assessment increased 
to the point that there was no amortization of the balance. Id. at 121-22, 197 
A.2d at 891. 
103. Id. at 123, 197 A.2d at 892. The court did affirm the lower court ruling that 
the contract could be interpreted to allow the separate payment of taxes and 
insurance. Id. at 123-24, 197 A.2d at 892. 
104. Id. at 123, 197 A.2d at 892. 
105. Id. at 125, 197 A.2d at 893. 
106. See Carlyle Apartments Joint Venture v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 333 Md. 265, 
274, 635 A.2d 366, 370 (1994). 
1993) Mortgage Prepayment 315 
tives are to breach the contract through default or other violation 
and then pay the loan when the creditor accelerates (assuming that 
the creditor would choose to accelerate rather than' sue on each 
individual payment); purchase the property in foreclosure; or forfeit 
the property: The disadvantages of these options are obvious. From 
the borrower's standpoint there is harm to his credit rating and a 
risk of losing his investment and appreciation in the property. 107 
From the creditor's standpoint, there is the likelihood that, if forced 
to recognize the default, recovery would be limited to the principal 
balance, accrued interest, and costs, not the expectation damages he 
would have received had a breach by prepayment been allowed. lOS 
IV. THE PREPAYMENT CLAUSE 
The Promenade Towers decision and the inherent difficulty in 
breaching a loan contract by prepayment make negotiation of pre-
payment terms essential for the non-residential borrower lO9 in Mar-
yland. Careful planning of prepayment provisions is also important 
for the lender, however, as the case lawllo presents a strange paradox. 
Despite the general rule that there is no prepayment unless provided 
for in the loan documents, courts have tended to subject prepayment 
. clauses to exacting standards, and on occasion, have not been hesitant 
to strike a negotiated clause, leaving the borrower with an unhindered 
right to prepay. 
107. See, e.g., Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 568 
(9th Cir. 1988) ("[Dlefaults are messy things; they are supposed to be. "). 
108. Clearly it is to the benefit of both parties to negotiate and come to terms 
when the mortgagor wishes to prepay. One commentator has noted, however, 
that although the rule of perfect tender in time prevents prepayment at the 
mortgagor's initiative when the loan documents are silent, some states statutorily 
prohibit collection of a prepayment fee unless provided for in the loan contract. 
The lender is thus left with no compromise position. Baldwin, supra note 75, 
at 413-14. 
109. Maryland's Commercial Law Code, § 12-126, enacted in reaction to the Prom-
enade Towers decision, provides that on a non-commercial loan secured by a 
borrower's primary residence, the borrower may prepay all or part of the 
unpaid balance at any time "except to the extent expressly provided otherwise 
in the loan contract." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-126 (Supp. 1993). A 
commercial loan is defined as a loan "made solely to acquire or carryon a 
business or commercial enterprise" or made "to any business or commercial 
organization." [d. § 12-101(c) (1990). Thus, the protection of the statute does 
not reach loans made to individuals for business purposes, or loans secured 
by properties other than the borrower's primary residence, such as second or 
vacation homes. In these instances, the borrower must negotiate prepayment 
rights or be subject to the rule of perfect tender in time. 
110. Except as previously discussed, there is no Maryland case law addressing the 
interpretation and enforcement of prepayment clauses. The discussion that 
follows surveys cases from across the country in an effort to highlight the 
national trends and some of the more predominant approaches to analysis. 
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Generally, prepayment clauses establish if and when prepayment 
is to be permitted, and how the prepayment premium, if any, is to 
be cafculated. III The drafting of prepayment clauses has evolved over 
the years. Initially, such clauses tended to restrict prepayment for a 
number of years, and then allowed prepayment upon payment of an 
additional percentage of either the original loan amount or the then 
outstanding balance. Often the required percentage was decreased 
over time. 1l2 The arbitrary nature of these clauses earned them the 
nomenclature of "prepayment penalties." The penalty was not cal-
culated to have any relation to the harm to the lender in the event 
of prepayment; the percentage fee was stated within the loan docu-
ments and did not vary according to the prevailing market. Thus, a 
lender would collect the fee even though interest rates had risen and 
the lender was actually advantaged by the prepayment. 
The modern trend is to use instead what has been termed a 
"yield equivalent" or "make whole" formula. JJ3 In this type of 
clause, the prepayment fee is tied to an objective measurement of 
current interest rates, such as United States Treasury Bonds. In the 
event of prepayment, the borrower is required to provide the lender 
with the amount that is necessary to purchase bonds providing the 
same yield and maturity as the prepaid loan. 114 An alternative formula 
calculates the difference between the contract yield and the current 
yield on a specified investment, such as United States Treasury Notes, 
of the same maturity, and requires the borrower to pay the present 
value of the interest differential applied to the outstanding balance. liS 
Under either of these formulas, the borrower pays only if interest 
rates have fallen below 'the contract rate; a penalty is not extracted 
if the lender benefits from the prepayment. 1I6 
Ill. The silent loan contract has been referred to as a "non-option" prepayment, 
as distinguished from the "option" prepayment where the prepayment terms 
are specified in the loan documents. Williams v. Fassler, 167 Cal. Rptr. 545, 
547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
112. Thomas C. Homburger & Matthew K. Phillips, What You See Is Not Always 
What You Get: The Enforceability of Loan Prepayment Penalties, 23 J. 
MARSHALL L. REv. 65, 66 (1989); Debra P. Stark, Enforcing Prepayment 
Charges: Case Law and Drafting Suggestions, 22 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 
549, 552-53 (1987); Weinberger, supra note 72, at 16-17. 
113. See Chester L. Fisher, III, Make-Whole Prepayment Premiums Under Attack, 
45 Bus. LAW. 15, 17-18 (Nov. 1989); Homburger & Phillips, supra note 112, 
at 67; Stark, supra note 112, at 553; Weinberger, supra note 72, at 17-18. 
114. See Stark, supra note 112, at 553; see also Warrington 611 Assocs. v. Aetna 
Life Ins. Co., 705 F. Supp. 229, 234 (D.N.J. 1989) (defining "yield maintenance 
fee"). 
115. See Weinberger, supra note 72, at 17. 
116. There has been some criticism of the selection of U.S. Government obligations 
as the measuring standard. See: e.g., In re Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that because government securities are lower risk 
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Challenges to loan contract clauses providing for a fee in the 
event of prepayment have generally focused on two elements: the 
validity of the imposition of any prepayment premium at all, and, 
if allowed, the validity of the method used to calculate the prepay-
ment fee. 
A. The Validity oj the Imposition oj a Prepayment Premium 
Objectively, the lender should receive the negotiated prepayment 
charge regardless of the circumstances of prepayment. Courts, how-
ever, have utilized both contract interpretation and equity principles 
to deny the lender the charge when prepayment is deemed beyond 
the borrower's control. There are four general situations which lead 
to prepayment: (1) condemnation of the property; (2) receipt of 
insurance proceeds upon destruction of the improvements; (3) the 
lender's acceleration of the loan under the terms of the contract; and 
(4) a prepayment initiated by the borrower due to a refinance or sale 
of the property. Of these, the lender's position is sound only in the 
last instance.1l7 The lender is least likely to collect a prepayment fee 
in the event of prepayment as a result of condemnation or insurance 
compensation, and the ability to collect in the event of acceleration 
is dependent upon careful drafting of the prepayment provisions. 
1. Condemnation 
In condemnation or eminent domain proceedings, the govern-
ment is required to reimburse the landowner for the property taken 
based upon an appraisal of the fair market value of the property. 118 
Under Maryland law, mortgagees are parties to the condemnation 
suit. 119 Mortgage contracts ordinarily require the application of con-
demnation proceeds to the principal balance of the loan on the theory 
that the security for the loan has been reduced. l20 The reported cases 
investments commanding lower rates, calculations based upon these securities 
overcompensate the lender); see also infra note 177. But see Debra P. Stark, 
Prepayment Charges in Jeopardy: The Unhappy and Uncertain Legacy of In 
re Skyler Ridge, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 191, 196-97 (1989) (addressing 
the Skyler Ridge court's criticism). 
117. See Homburger & Phillips, supra note 112, at 70. 
118. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 12-104(a), 12-105(b), 12-207(c) (1988). 
See generally RICHARD A. REID, CONDEMNATION & EMINENT DOMAIN (1988). 
119. A proceeding for condemnation is to be brought against all parties who have 
an interest in the property to be condemned. MD. R. U4(b) (1993). If such a 
party is not designated in the petition for condemnation, there is no transfer 
of that party's interest to the condemnor. Department of Nat. Resources v. 
Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 521 A.2d 313 (1986). 
120. See KRATOvn. & WERNER, supra note 6, § 6.07; see also JACOB RABKIN & 
MARK H. JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS, Form 21.78, at 21-5101 (1993). 
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show a reluctance to enforce prepayment charges in this situation. 121 
lola Corp. v. Berkeley Savings & Loan Ass'n l22 is an excellent 
example. The prepayment clause at issue in that case, which provided 
for a prepayment fee if the loan was prepaid during the first five 
years of the loan, spoke of the mortgagor's "right and privilege" to 
prepay.123 Condemnation proceeds were released to the first mort-
gagee, who paid the second mortgagee, retained an amount sufficient 
to cover the outstanding balance, accrued interest, and a prepayment 
fee, and forwarded the remainder to the mortgagor. 124 The mortgagor 
sued for recovery of the prepayment charges withheld. 125 The court 
held that the prepayment occurred by operation of law rather than 
by exercise of a right or privilege by the mortgagors. 126 The prepay-
ment clause, as worded, was found not to contemplate prepayment 
due to condemnation; the court indicated that the mortgage should 
specifically provide for this event.J27 
The mortgagee in Village of Rosemont v. Maywood-Proviso 
State Bankl28 thought it was providing for this contingency with a 
mortgage clause that gave the mortgagor the right to either prepay, 
including a prepayment fee, or provide substitute security in the event 
the mortgagor "shall (whether voluntarily or by operation of law) 
sell, convey, assign, mortgage, hypothecate, or otherwise transfer or 
encumber the mortgaged premises."129 The court found the clause to 
be ambiguous because although it provided for payment upon transfer 
by operation of law, it was prefaced by operative words requiring 
mortgagor action. The court concluded that "in the event of con-
demnation, performance of a prepayment penalty clause will be 
121. See generally Vicki A. Huffman, Annotation, Compensation jor Interest Pre-
payment Penalty in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 84 A.L.R.3D 946 (1978 & 
Supp. 1993). 
122. 250 A.2d 150 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969). 
123. Id. at 151-52. 
124. Id. at 151. 
125. Id. at 152. 
126. Id. at 154. 
127. Id. at 154-55. Accord Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1954) 
(denying mortgagee interest for remaining term of note upon condemnation 
payoff of loan without prepayment privilege, as condemnation law existed at 
time of contracting and could have been provided for in loan contract); 
Associated Schs., Inc. v. Dade County, 209 So. 2d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1968) (relying upon Shavers to deny contractual prepayment penalty where 
property was taken by eminent domain). 
128. 501 N.E.2d 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). The caption of the case refers to the 
condemnation action. Maywood-Proviso State Bank, in a trustee capacity, was 
the owner/mortgagor in this instance; the appeal was brought by the mortgagee, 
Lyons Savings and Loan Association, which was contesting the court-ordered 
distribution of the condemnation proceeds. Id. at 860. 
129. Id. 
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excused unless there is clear language which expressly delineates 
payment of a premium upon condemnation. "130 Thus, to be certain 
of the ability to collect a prepayment premium in condemnation 
cases, lenders should not rely upon blanket provisions, but should 
require that the mortgage documents expressly state that such a fee 
is payable in the event of condemnation. 131 
Arguments that the condemning government should be liable for 
the prepayment premium, either to the mortgagee directly or as part 
of the mortgagor's just compensation award as a loss incidental to 
the condemnation, have been unsuccessful. The court in lola Corp. 
found such a claim to be "frivolous .... A prepayment charge as 
here claimed is not a factor to be considered in arriving at fair value 
nor is it an element of damage incidental to the taking." 132 Similarly, 
on the grounds that just compensation is based upon the fair market 
130. Id. at 862. The court further found that the prepayment provision of the note 
"evinces an intent to enforce the penalty only if Maywood chooses to prepay." 
Id. A similar approach was used in Landohio Corp. v. Northwestern Mut. 
Life Mortgage & Realty Investors, 431 F. Supp. 475 (N.D. Ohio 1976), to hold 
that prepayment resulting from a sale under threat of condemnation did not 
amount to the mortgagor's exercise of a "privilege" to prepay. 
In the case of DeKalb County v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 219 S.E.2d 
707,710 (Ga. 1975), the court's approach was less logical. The note in question 
prohibited prepayment during the first five years of the loan and provided for 
a sliding percentage premium for prepayments thereafter. Id. at 708-09. The 
court held that no premium was payable on a prepayment due to condemnation 
during the prohibition period, stating that "it cannot be contended that [the 
lender] is claiming a premium for the exercise of a right bargained for with 
the [borrower, as the borrower] had no right whatsoever to prepay for a period 
of five years from the date of the making of the note." Id. at 710. The 
resulting inference, that had the condemnation occurred in year six the lender 
would have been entitled to the prepayment premium, directly contradicts the 
relative rights of the parties at the times involved. 
131. Only one case involving a contractual provision for prepayment due to con-
demnation is noted in Huffman's annotation. Huffman, supra note 121, at 
951 (citing In re Brooklyn Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Project, 260 
N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965». That case involved, not a prepayment 
premium per se, but a contract provision specifying that the mortgagor would 
be responsible for payment of the difference between the 6070 note rate and 
the 40/0 interest rate which the condemning body was required to pay by statute. 
Brooklyn Bridge, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 231. As the contract provision did not 
involve an increased payment by the condemnor, but merely determined the 
apportionment of the condemnation proceeds between the property owner and 
the mortgagee, the court declined to interfere with the contract. Id. at 232-33. 
132. Jala Corp. v. Berkeley Sav. & Loan, 250 A.2d 150, 154-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1969). The court, in Jala Corp., cited Knoxville Hous. Auth., Inc. 
v. Bush, 408 S.W.2d 407 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966), for the proposition that a 
prepayment charge should not be considered in arriving at fair value or damage 
incidental to the taking. Jola Corp., 250 A.2d at 155. It should be noted that 
in Bush, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee clearly limited the issue to one of 
statutory interpretation. Bush, 408 S. W .2d at 410-11. 
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value of the condemned property and is not related to apportionment 
of the condemnation award, the court in Village of Rosemont rejected 
the mortgagee's assertion that it had been deprived of the ability to 
protect its right to the prepayment premium by its exclusion from 
an agreement reached by the mortgagor and the Village. 133 
2. Insurance Proceeds 
In Chestnut Corp. v. Bankers Bond & Mortgage CO.,134 a case 
influencing the decision in Jala Corp., I3S a clause attaching a premium 
to the "right" to prepay was given a narrow construction to deny 
the premium when the mortgage was paid according to the terms of 
an insurance policy following destruction of the improvements by 
fire.136 Assessing the position of both the lender and the owner of 
the property, the court concluded that "[i]n such a situation both 
parties suffer, but the owner suffers most." 137 As such, given that 
"[n]either the bond nor the mortgage specifically or expressly pro-
vide[d] for the exact situation which ha[d] arisen," the mortgagee 
was not entitled to the prepayment premium.138 Thus, courts generally 
hold that when outside forces, such as condemnation or fire, cause 
early repayment of the loan, the loss of expected interest income on 
the contract should be borne by the mortgagee, unless that risk has 
been unequivocally assigned to the mortgagor within the loan con-
tract. 
3. Acceleration 
When prepayment is due to the mortgagee's acceleration l39 of 
the loan, the cases are less settled. Although the recent trend is 
otherwise, courts have generally viewed an acceleration as a voluntary 
act of the mortgagee. When acceleration is optional rather than self-
executing, the mortgagee has been held to forfeit the right to a 
prepayment premium when the right to accelerate is exercised. l40 The 
133. Village of Rosemont v. Maywood-Proviso State Bank, 501 N.E.2d 859, 862 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
134. 149 A.2d 48 (Pa. 1959). 
135. See lala Corp., 250 A.2d at 153. 
136. Chestnut Corp., 149 A.2d at 50. 
137. [d. 
138. [d. 
139. Most mortgage loans provide for acceleration when the mortgagor transfers 
the property, commonly known as a due on sale clause, or when the mortgagor 
defaults. When a loan is accelerated the full balance of the loan is due and 
payable immediately, rather than on the stated maturity date. 
140. The primary theory behind denying prepayment premiums upon acceleration 
is that there is technically no prepayment because the full balance is presently 
due. 
/ 
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rationale that the mortgagee forfeits the prepayment premium upon 
acceleration has been applied even when the loan is accelerated as a 
result of the borrower's failure to abide by the terms of the contract. 
An early case, holding that the mortgagee forfeits the prepayment 
premium, was Kilpatrick v. Germania Life Insurance Co., 141 in which 
the mortgagee began foreclosure proceedings after the mortgagor's 
default. When the mortgagor, who was able to secure other financing, 
subsequently tendered the full balance, the mortgagee halted the 
foreclosure proceedings, but refused to accept the payment unless 
the contractual prepayment 'bonus' was included. 142 The court stated 
that the mortgagee's election to consider the debt due became irrev-
ocable upon the mortgagor's assumption of other legal obligations 
in reliance on the mortgagee's actions. 143 The prepayment was thus 
found to have been involuntary, and the court allowed the mortgagor 
to recover the amount of the bonus. l44 
Later cases place little or no emphasis upon the mortgagor's 
reliance. In addition to a prepayment clause, the mortgage in Slevin 
Container Corp. v. Provident Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n l4S con-
tained a due on sale clause that prohibited the sale of the property 
without the mortgagee's approval. In the event of such a sale, the 
mortgagee had the option to increase the interest rate, accelerate the 
loan, or implicitly, continue to accept monthly payments. l46 After 
learning of an unapproved sale, the mortgagee chose to accelerate 
the loan. 147 The court, finding acceleration to have been the mort-
gagee's voluntary decision, held that the payment was a payment 
made after maturity; therefore, the mortgagee was not entitled to a 
prepayment premium. l48 This rationale was also applied in In re LHD 
Realty Corp. 149 to deny a prepayment premium to a mortgagee whose 
acceleration of the mortgage debt took the form of a petition for 
relief from the bankruptcy automatic stay to allow foreclosure pro-
ceedings. lso 
141. 75 N.E. 1124 (N.Y. 1905). 
142. Id. at 1125. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 1125-26. 
145. 424 N.E.2d 939 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 
146. Id. at 939-40. 
147. Id. at 940. 
148. Id. at 940-41; see also Baldwin, supra note 75, at 415-19 (discussing the 
combination of due on sale and prepayment clauses). 
149. 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1984). 
150. Id. at 331. Filing a petition for relief from the automatic stay is a voluntary 
acceleration of the debt by the creditor distinct from the automatic acceleration 
of the debt upon the filing of bankruptcy. See In re Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 
500, 507 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) ("The automatic acceleration of a debt upon 
the filing of a bankruptcy case is not the kind of acceleration that eliminates 
the right to a prepayment premium. "). 
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In Imperial Coronado Partners v. Home Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass'n,m however, the court allowed the mortgagee to collect the 
prepayment fee, reasoning that the mortgagor had failed to exercise 
options available to halt the acceleration. m Under California law, 
the mortgagor had the right to reinstate the loan by curing the 
default; under federal Bankruptcy law, the mortgagor could decel-
erate the loan.IS3 Because the mortgagor made a conscious decision 
instead to sell the property, the court found that the payoff was 
voluntary. 154 
In this same vein, courts have emphasized that a mortgagor 
cannot avoid a contractual prepayment fee on the basis that the loan 
was paid off in anticipation of an expected acceleration. In First 
Indiana Federal Savings Bank v. Maryland Development Co. ISS the 
court established a standard of requiring a clear and unequivocal 
exercise of the acceleration option by the lender before the prepay-
ment fee is forfeited. ls6 A refusal to consent to an assumption is not 
sufficient,IS7 nor is a voluntary payoff prior to sale of the mortgaged 
property made involuntary by the lender's expressed intention to 
accelerate the loan in exercise of a due on sale clause. ISS 
Recent cases reflect a willingness to enforce prepayment prem-
iums when the draftsmanship manifests attention to the concerns 
expressed in earlier decisions.ls9 When the prepayment provision is 
specific as to applicability upon acceleration, the premium has been 
upheld. l60 Failure to be precise can be fata4 however. For instance, 
despite strong evidence of a deliberate default, the court in Ferreira 
v. Yared l61 required the refund of a prepayment premium paid upon 
151. 96 B.R. 997 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989). 
152. Id. at 1000. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
ISS. 509 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
156. Id. at 257. 
157. Id. 
158. First Nat'l Bank of Springfield v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United 
States, 510 N .E.2d 518, 523 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
159. See Debra P. Stark, New Developments in En/orcing Prepayment Charges 
A/ter an Acceleration 0/ a Mortgage Loan, 26 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 
213, 215-16, 224-26 (1991). 
160. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Corporex Properties, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 423, 
428 (E.D. Ky. 1992) (finding prepayment provision entitling lender to premium 
upon default and acceleration "computed as if a voluntary prepayment had 
been made on the date of such acceleration" enforceable); In re Schaumburg 
Hotel, 97 B.R. 943, 953 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (enforcing prepayment premium 
due "whether said payment is voluntary or the result of prepayment created 
by the exercise of any acceleration clause after a default"). 
161. 588 N.E.2d 1370 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). 
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a refinance to avoid foreclosure. As to the equities involved, the 
court stated: 
It is not lost on us that a borrower may evade a· lawfully 
agreed to prepayment penalty by embarking on a course of 
conduct which provokes acceleration of the note. Indeed, 
that may have occurred here. There are, however, often 
risks and costs attendant upon default in a mortgage note 
and, on balance, it strikes us as the better course to adopt 
the majority view that, unless the note otherwise provides, 
a holder of a note cannot simultaneously accelerate the note 
and collect a prepayment penalty. 162 
B. The Validity oj the Amount oj the Prepayment Premium 
Evaluation of the amount of the prepayment premium will 
depend upon the characterization of the nature of the premium. 
There are three approaches that may be taken: The premium can be 
treated as consideration for relinquishment of the right to insist upon 
payment as scheduled, as a bargained-for contractual term, or as 
liquidated damages. How the premium is viewed depends, in part, 
upon the structure of the prepayment right. Where the loan contract 
provides no right at all, a later agreement reached between the parties 
to allow prepayment generally results in treatment of the prepayment 
premium as consideration in exchange for the contract modi fica-
tion. 163 Where the loan contract provides the right to prepay in 
162. Id. at 1371-72; see also Stark, supra note 159, at 229-31 (discussing intentional 
default). But see Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 
564, 567 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that mortgagor can precipitate a 
default and insist on acceleration by tendering balance due plus prepayment 
fee where note prevented prepayment for initial 12 years of loan, but provided 
for 10070 prepayment premium for prepayment resulting from default). 
Another example of strained reasoning to reach a result favorable to the 
mortgagor is Clinton Capital Corp. v. Straeb, 589 A.2d 1363 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1990), where in disallowing a prepayment premium to ·be paid 
"whether prepayment is voluntary or involuntary, including any prepayment 
made after exercise of any acceleration provision," id. at 1364, the court 
construed "involuntary" to mean "actions of third parties which force the 
payment of the mortgage prematurely." Id. at 1371. In a non sequitur, the 
court then stated that "[this) is not the situation that exists on the facts in 
this case ... none of the defendants have taken action to force [the lender) 
to accelerate the mortgage [to) avoid a prepayment penalty." Id. The court's 
primary concern seems to be the effect of the 10% prepayment premium, when 
combined with a default interest rate of 24%, upon the mortgagor's ability to 
redeem the property. Id. A liquidated damages analysis would have been the 
more appropriate approach to reach the equitable result the court desired, 
while avoiding a convoluted construction of the prepayment provision. 
163. See Baldwin, supra note 75, at 420. 
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exchange for a specified premium, the premium usually will be treated 
as a bargained-for contractual term when prepayment is voluntary.l64 
Under either of these evaluations, the premium generally is subject 
to nullification only if it is determined to be unconscionable. 165 
When the premium becomes due upon a prepayment occasioned 
by the mortgagor's default, however, courts often subject the pre-
mium to a liquidated damages analysis. l66 Under this analysis, if the 
premium is considered to be a penalty for breach, rather than a 
reasonable estimate of damages, the prepayment clause will not be 
enforced. 167 In decisions which caused some controversy,l68 the bank-
ruptcy courts of the central district of California and the western 
district of Missouri used a liquidated damages approach to invalidate 
two yield maintenance clauses. l69 Although it should be noted that 
164. See Baldwin, supra note 75, at 421-23 (citing court characterizations of option 
prepayment clauses as giving the mortgagor the ability to choose between 
alternative performances); see also West Raleigh Group v. Massachusetts Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 809 F. Supp. 384, 391 (B.D. N.C. 1992) (rejecting claim that 
yield differential prepayment clause was unenforceable liquidated damages 
provision as the prepayment premium was "bargained-for consideration for 
the option to prepay, and as such it is enforceable as a matter of contract law 
and not as a measure of damages"); Renda v. Gouchberg, 343 N.E.2d 159, 
160 (Mass. App. Ct. 1976) (rejecting liquidated damages analysis as "the 
plaintiffs' prepayment constituted a voluntary election on their part"). 
165. See Stark, supra note 112, at 550 n.7 and accompanying text. But see In re 
A.J. Lane Co., 113 B.R. 821, 827-28 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (arguing that 
prepayment is not a "true" alternative performance, and that liquidated 
damages analysis is, therefore, the proper approach for all prepayment clauses). 
166. Baldwin, supra note 75, at 423. 
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) ("Damages for breach by 
either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount that is 
reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach 
and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated 
damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty. "); see also 
Holloway v. Faw, Casson & Co., 319 Md. 324, 354, 572 A.2d 510, 525 (1990); 
Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co., 73 Md. App. 281, 289-90, 533 A.2d 1316, 1320 
(1987). It should be noted that the common characterization of the prepayment 
fee as a "prepayment penalty" is not related to a liquidated damages analysis, 
and the parties' choice of terminology within the document should not be 
determinative. See West Raleigh Group v. Massachusetts Life Ins. Co., ~09 F. 
Supp. 384, 390-91 (B.D.N.C. 1992); see also Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md; 649, 
661, 332 A.2d 651, 660 (1975) (stating that nomenclature used by the parties 
is not determinative of whether payment is a penalty). 
168. See Fisher, supra note 113; Stark, supra note 116. 
169. See In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 88 B.R. 997 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1988); In re 
Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500 (Bankr.. C.D. Cal: 1987). In Skyler Ridge, the court 
invalidated a yield maintenance clause which required payment of the differ-
ential between the note rate and a comparable U.S. Treasury note yield, with 
a floor payment of 1 % of the principal balance. Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 505. 
The court found the failure to adjust for the normal difference in rate between 
first mortgages and Treasury notes; the lack of a discount for present value; 
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in each of these cases the mortgagee was to receive full payoff of 
the principal balance owed, and as the courts frankly admitted, 
payment of any prepayment premium would have either frustrated 
the implementation of an otherwise feasible plan of reorganization,I7O 
or would have precluded the claims of other secured creditors against 
the proceeds of the property, 171 the willingness of the court to 
invalidate a negotiated prepayment charge in a contract between two 
sophisticated parties is significant. 
A clause calling for a fixed one percent prepayment premium 
has also been invalidated under a liquidated damages analysis. 172 The 
court in In re A.J. Lane & Co. found the clause to be unreasonable 
both in light of the lender's anticipated loss, because a loss was 
presumed, and in light of the lender's actual loss, because interest 
rates at the time of prepayment were in fact higher than the note 
rate. 173 Although it seems that the answer to the court's concerns 
would be to use a properly formulated yield maintenance clause. The 
court also stated that the prerequisite finding of difficulty of proof 
of loss necessary to uphold a liquidated damages provision could not 
be made in the prepayment situation because the common usage of 
such formulas demonstrates that the damage formula is "simple and 
well-established.' '174 This characterization has been subsequently crit-
icized as being over-simplistic. 17s . 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently addressed a mort-
gagor's challenge of the validity of a premium charged in connection 
with the mortgagor's voluntary prepayment of its commercial loan 
and the failure to amortize the floor payment, which the lender justified as 
recoupment of transaction costs over the life of the loan to be unreasonable, 
and thus totally unenforceable under the common law. Id. at 506. The Kroh 
Brothers court, using Skyler Ridge as precedent, invalidated a similar provision 
on the same grounds. 
170. Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. at 503. 
171. Kroh Bros., 88 B.R. at 999. 
172. In re A.l. Lane & Co., 113 B.R. 821 (D. Mass. 1990). 
173. Id. at 829. But see In re Schaumburg Hotel Owner Ltd. Partnership, 97 B.R. 
943 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (upholding 10070 prepayment premium as reasonable 
estimate of damages where actual losses exceeded that amount). 
174. A.J. Lane, 113 B.R. at 829. The court characterized the formula as "the 
difference in the interest yield between the contract rate and the market rate 
at the time of prepayment, projected over the term of the loan and then 
discounted to arrive at present value." Id. 
175. See In re Financial Ctr. Assoc. of East Meadow, L.P., 140 B.R. 829, 836-37 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding the A.J. Lane formula to be "a general 
description of the factors to be included in a proper approach which at best 
may only provide an appropriate range within which a particular result may 
be considered appropriate," and answering the query "does the mere existence 
of a workable formula mandate a conclusion that damages are easily deter-
minable" in the negative). 
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in Carlyle Apartments Joint Venture v. AIG Life Insurance CO.176 
The loan documents permitted the mortgagor to prepay the loan in 
full after the first year of the five-year term and provided for a 
prepayment premium "equal to the difference in yield between the 
Loan . . . and a Treasury Note in the amount of the prepayment 
proceeds with a term equal to the remaining term of the Loan. "177 
The mortgagor sought to have the court declare the prepayment 
premium clause void as a liquidated damages clause that imposed a 
penalty.178 The court of appeals did not reach the liquidated damages 
question, however, because it rejected the premise that the mortga-
gor's prepayment, made in accordance with the terms of the loan 
contract, was a breach. 179 As there was no breach, there was "no 
occasion to consider damages ... much less to alter the contract."180 
The Maryland answer to the question of whether a liquidated damages 
analysis would be appropriate when prepayment results from the 
lender's acceleration of the loan following the mortgagor's default 
will "await a case presenting those facts." 181 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Promenade Towers decision settled the issue of whether 
Maryland follows the rule of perfect tender in time. Although the 
process began with Carlyle Apartments, a comprehensive judicial 
approach to the enforcement of that rule and to the interpretation 
of negotiated prepayment arrangements has yet to develop in Mar-
176. 333 Md. 265, 635 A.2d 366 (1994). This opinion was issued in response to 
questions certified to the court by the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland. [d. at 265 n.l, 635A.2d at 366 n.t. 
177. [d. at 267, 635 A.2d at 366-67. For a discussion of yield equivalent prepayment 
premium calculations see supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. This case 
illustrates a common criticism of the use of government securities as the index 
investment for yield equivalent calculations. See supra note 116. The selection 
of Treasury Notes as the yield against which the prepayment fee was to be 
calculated apparently was the catalyst to this mortgagor's challenge to the 
prepayment premium, as the mortgagor was not attempting to avoid the 
prepayment fee altogether. Carlyle Apartments, 333 Md. at 280, 635 A.2d at 
373. The note rate on the loan was 10.250/0. At the time the mortgagor 
requested payoff figures from the lender the Treasury Note Yield was 4.136%, 
while the "FHFB Nat'l Mortgage Contract Rate" was approximately 7.49%. 
[d. at 269 n.2, 635 A.2d at 367 n.2. The yield difference was thus over 3% 
higher than had a mortgage-related interest rate index been chosen, a significant 
difference on a loan exceeding $3 million. 
178. Carlyle Apartments, 333 Md. at 280, 635 A.2d at 373; see supra notes 116 & 
177. 
179. Carlyle Apartments, 333 Md. at 270-74, 635 A.2d at 368-70; see supra note 
164. 
180. Carlyle Apartments, 330 Md. at 279, 635 A.2d at 373. 
181. [d. at 278n.4, 635 A.2d at 372 n.4. 
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yland. When faced with these issues, however, Maryland judges will 
have the advantage of starting with a clean slate and will, if care is 
taken, be able to avoid some of the inconsistencies and contradictions 
that have developed in other jurisdictions. 
First, the rule of perfect tender in time should mean that a 
prepayment not provided for in the loan documents is a breach, not 
that it is prohibited absolutely. Maryland courts should be willing to 
abrogate or distinguish the limited case law that supports specific 
performance of a loan contract,.82 and allow mortgagors, even where 
the contract is silent, to breach by prepayment. As in any other 
breach of contract action, the mortgagor should then be held liable 
for all damages proved by the lender. 183 The modern use of yield 
maintenance clauses and other such prepayment options has shown 
that the expectation interest of the lender is quantifiable; the lender 
should not be able to use silence in order to circumvent the usual 
contract remedies. Silence should represent the decision of the lender 
to pursue actual damages in the event of a breach by prepayment 
instead of establishing a predetermined approximation that may not, 
in fact, result in full recompense for the effects of an early repayment. 
Second, where the cost of the right to prepay is predetermined 
and specified in the loan documents, Maryland judges should be 
willing to enforce the clauses as drafted. Drafters of loan documents 
and parties involved in loan negotiations have a responsibility to 
clearly define the intention of the parties regarding loan prepayment 
rights. Once those rights are established, however, the agreement 
reached by the parties should be respected, especially in commercial 
settings involving sophisticated parties with equivalent bargaining 
power. Where the mortgagor has agreed to pay a prepayment pre-
mium regardless of the event precipitating the prepayment, that 
agreement should be honored. 
182. The Carlyle Apartments court quoted Pierson v. Pyles, 234 Md. 119, 124, 197 
A.2d 89, 893 (1964), for the following proposition: "We do not think the 
situation here calls for a result which would defeat valuable contractual rights 
of the [lender]." Carlyle Apartments, 333 Md. at 279, 635 A.2d at 373. There 
is a significant difference, however, between the court's upholding of a con-
tractual clause providing for a premium in exchange for the right to prepay in 
Carlyle Apartments and the court's de facto grant of specific performance of 
the installment land sales contract in Pierson. See supra notes 102-06. Hope-
fully, the court's use of an appropriate quote from Pierson does not represent 
an unwillingness to reexamine the conclusion reached in that case. 
183. This is thus not a suggestion that the effect of Promenade Towers be lessened 
or that the balance of rights between the lender and borrower established by 
that case be changed. Damages should include costs incurred as a result of a 
borrower's attempts to frustrate the lender's pursuit of actual damages, and 
the lender's security interest in the property should extend to the borrower's 
liability for damages. 
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Finally, if a liquidated damages analysis is applied to evaluate 
a prepayment premium when the prepayment is prompted by the 
lender's acceleration of the loan following a mortgagor default, the 
courts should take care to consider all relevant factors when deter-
mining the effect of the prepayment on the lender. In addition to 
the contract-to-market interest rate differential, tax ramifications, the 
cost of reinvestment, and the relative risks of the investment options 
foreseeably available to the lender in comparison to the loan being 
prepaid should be evaluated. Where the calculation specified by the 
prepayment clause is reasonable, even though not exact, the negoti-
ated amount should be awarded. Where the amount determined by 
the prepayment clause is clearly unreasonable or exorbitant, the courts 
should either modify the award to eliminate the unreasonable feature, 
or allow the lender to prove actual damages. Striking the prepayment 
clause altogether ignores the relative rights of the parties prior to 
negotiation and inverts the rule of "perfect tender in time" to give 
the borrower the absolute right to prepay without charge. 
Rebecca C. Dietz 
